Dynastic Struggle and the Peoples Democratic Party in the Post-Adedibu Era in Oyo State, Nigeria

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Lamidi Adedibu, until his death on June 11, 2008, maintained a firm grip on the Peoples Democratic Party’s machinery in Oyo state, Nigeria. He effectively deployed his political connections with Abuja to control party executives, commissioners, and local government bosses and their resources. His Molete home became a rallying point for sectional leaders for lobby and patronage. With a large pool of foot soldiers, the ‘garrison commander’ planned, executed and won elections, including the impeachment of his estranged godson, Rasidi Ladoja. His political tentacles were intimidating to the extent that it was suicidal to dare the ‘garrison commander’. Adedibu passed on before the 2011 polls. This paper attempts an examination of the remote and immediate causes of PDP crises. Data were gathered using both primary and secondary sources. The findings revealed that Adedibu’s demise before the polls created a leadership tussle within his political dynasty. The lacuna so created led to the search for the missing focal point. Governor Adebayo Alao-Akala’s second-term ambition and his centralised leadership style further polarised the party. A puny attempt to reconcile the disintegrating forces collapsed and weakened the political chances of the PDP. The Ibadan factor, unresolved internal wrangling, the conflict between Akala and the Alaafin of Oyo, and the defection of Rasidi Ladoja to contest the polls militated against the victory of PDP in the post-Adedibu era. The lack of mastery of Oyo politics which characterised the Adedibu era, is the missing link in the post-Adedibu PDP.

Keywords: Lamidi Adedibu, Oyo State, Politics, Rasidi Ladoja

Introduction
Ibadan has enjoyed a rich history of political godfatherism. Each of these godfathers operated a peculiar style of politics, with a distinctive structure. Ibadan has enjoyed the political leadership of Adisa Meredith Akinloye and Adegoke Adelabu in the 1950s; Chief Adelakun, in the Second Republic (1979-1983); and Chief Lamidi Adedibu who rose to prominence in the Third (1991-1993) and Fourth Republics (1999-2008) until his sudden demise in 2008. These godfathers had some things in common: they were close to the poor, through whom they derived their political strengths and supports; enjoyed vast political victory; they had foot soldiers of truants and deviants whom they sheltered and fed. Their common area of strength is the strategic location of their residences at the earth of the city; usually near the market which afforded unfettered access to their followers and vice versa. They used the poor and illiterates who actively participated in electoral process to their advantage. And with this support, they fought political foes to the point of annihilation. This source

Adedibu was subjectively evaluated by people in relation to the interpretative understanding of the course of his actions and its effects on individuals and the society.

He was a student in the United Kingdom and the first chairman of the West African Students Union (WASU). He was a member of the ‘Committee of Peoples Against Imperialism’ of which both Late Dr Nuamdi Azikiwe and Dr Kwame Nkrumah were also members. He was a member of the Labour Party in London.

Akinloye returned home in 1950 and founded the local politics of Ibadan through political activism. He worked with similar minds to build a political structure and founded the Ibadan Peoples Party (IPP) serving as its first president. The Vice president was Adégoke Adelabu fondly called ‘Penkele meesi’.
of influence, as Omobowale and Olutayo (2007) observes, describes Ibadan political structure on clientelism.

These political godfathers shielded themselves under the protection of the poor through carrot-and-stick politicking, while exploiting their vulnerability to pursue their economic and political interests, as well as the hegemonic control of the ruling class. Despite their demise and style of politicking, they remain a reference point in contemporary politics in Oyo State. According to Albert (2005), the study of political elite and leadership is crucial for understanding the trajectories of development in any society. He argues that political elitism is associated with inequality. The elite simply create hierarchy and inequality in the process of influencing decisions and allocating resources within and among social units (Welsh, 1979). As Albert (2005) further notes, political godfathers consist of rich men whose contributions to the campaign funds of some candidates have helped the latter to win elections. They invest heavily in the media to shore up the image of their candidates, while at the same time helping to discredit rival candidates. They "build an array of loyalists around them and use their influence, which is often tied to monetary considerations, to manipulate the rest of the society...they use their influence to block the participation of others in Nigerian politics" (Albert, 2005:82). This is why to Adebanwi (2005) and Moss (2007), godfatherism is an antithesis and a clog in the wheel of strengthening of democratic values in Nigeria.

The existence of a vast political structure is seen as sine qua non to electoral victory in Nigeria. Political parties and candidates curry favour with godfathers/patrons who possess the needed electoral value for the actualisation of political success/victory. As a result, political patrons continue to play politics which make them relevant by maintaining their clientelistic structure. A number of scholarly works had labelled Nigeria politics as prebendal (Joseph, 1987; Fawole, 2005; Ibeanu, 2007). Prebendalism entails self-aggrandisement by political chieftains who use their political connections for the appropriation of collective patrimony. They are able to achieve this feat via centralised authority.

This paper is centrally concerned with Lamidi Adedibu (1927-2008), his relevance and the position of his last party, Peoples Democratic Party, after his death. Adedibu deployed his political clientele to install and deliver electoral victories for clients who sought his support. Adedibu owned a political dynasty in his "self-styled" politics. Adedibu, through his vast political connection can be said to have possessed executive, legislative and judicial powers. Most of these were through those he enthroned. Adedibu started his political career in 1951 when he was just about 24 years. He provided shelter to vagabonds and truants, fed them and utilised them to achieve his political interests in times of need. They served as his foot soldiers. Adedibu mastered the Yoruba saying 'bi oonje ba ti kuro ninu ise, ise buse' (food is crucial for man's survival and relieves poverty or wretchedness) introducing the amala and gbegiri politics which endeared him to the poor and needy (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007). He utilised the society 'rejects' to become a political colossus that was sought after by the high and mighty. As observed by Albert (2005), the power of a patron lies in his position in government, the number of privileged people he has or has successfully planted in government, hence his ability to directly or indirectly manipulate bureaucratic regulations.

Studies exist on varying aspects of socio-political activities in Ibadan including political actors such as Lamidi Adedibu (Abdul-Jelil, 2009, Adeoye, 2009, Watson, 2000, Osifodurin, 2005; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007; Watson, 2000, Lucas, 1998, Yahaya, 2007 and Acheikuwuma, 2007). Analysis of the post-Adedibu era in Oyo State is limited in the literature. The colossal influence which Adedibu had on Oyo State politics in the latter part of his political career makes a post-humous analysis important. The shredding of his political godsons into factions, the unresolved conflicts and the consequences of such dynastic struggle need scholarly attention.

Political activities revolved mainly around Adedibu during his lifetime. He served as the focal

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(Peculiar Mess). The pair of Akinloye and Adelabu played a major role in the dramatic elections of 1951, winning all the 6 seats in Ibadan, and merged with Awolowo’s AG (29) to defeat NCNC which won 32 seats. Akinloye died in 2007.

Adelabu died in 1958.

4 Adedibu reportedly slumped and died before arriving at the University College Hospital (UCH) where he was being rushed for medical attention.

5 Markets are a major avenue for the mobilisation of public opinion and to a large extent, determine electoral success of a candidate.
point in allocation of positions and settlement of disputes. This leadership style has great implication for intra-party relationships (Ogundiya, 2010) particularly the post-Adedibu PDP with the balkanisation of the Adedibu political family. What are the remote and immediate causes of PDP crises after the death of Adedibu? And what were the consequences for the PDP and the politics in Oyo State. Using the purposive sampling technique, data were generated via in-depth interviews. Two interview sessions I had with Chief Lamidi Adedibu prior to the impeachment of Senator Rashidi Ladoja in 2006 and another in May, 2008, a fortnight to his death. In all, 20 politicians, across factions in the Peoples Democratic Party were also interviewed. The factions are: Senator Rashidi Ladoja faction; Senator Lekan Balogun faction; Richard Akinjide faction, Hazeem Gbolarumni faction and Yekinni Adeojo faction. The interviews were coded, thematically arranged and content analysed.

Results of the Study

The Relevance of Adedibu in Ibadan Politics

Lamidi Adedibu (1927-2008) started his political career in 1951 as a member of Obafemi Awolowo’s Action Group (AG). Adedibu can, therefore, be said to have started with a ‘progressive’ political ideology which focussed on people-oriented policies aimed at ameliorating the plights of the masses. After staying for many years with Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Adedibu took a detour and joined the Northern People’s Congress under the leadership of Sir Ahmadu Bello who controlled the government at the centre. He later moved to the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the Second Republic. He joined the National Republican Convention (NRC) in the aborted Third Republic and formally pitched his tent with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) after defecting from All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in the Fourth Republic.

Adedibu remained a leader to be reckoned with in the Western Region. To Adedibu, there was much to gain through mainstream politics. Politics was a serious business and highest dividends could only surface if he had association with the government at the centre. Adedibu unrepentantly pursued a course he believed in. He had a self-definition of cheating and betrayal in political context. At the age of 31, in 1958, Adedibu gave an inkling of the brand of politics he was to unleash on Ibadan four decades after. A semblance of political activism and violence was carried out by Adedibu at the historic Mapo Hall during the ceremony marking Awolowo’s inauguration as the Premier of Western region.

On that event, in 1958, he personally broke the gate of Mapo Hall⁶ and opened it to pave way for the newly installed premier of Western Nigeria to use the venue for his political campaign. The Action Group had obtained a permit to use Mapo Hall after paying two pounds (£2) to Adegoke Adelabu⁷ to use the hall. However, Adelabu locked the gate while Awolowo’s supporters were awaiting their leader to address them after taking oath at the government secretariat. Adedibu broke the gate open for the venue to be used against the resistance of the incumbent government. Thus, Adedibu was not averse to employing coercion for actualisation of political interests. And he used this throughout his political career. The fear of violence and use of force conscripted many to do his bidding.

He deployed this also to weaken opposition and obtain compliance. It was apparent that Adedibu’s excesses were also endured for the political gains of political gladiators. By this, Adedibu appeared to have been condoned as a useful instrument at the whims and caprices of those in power. He stressed that:

The day Awolowo was installed as the premier of the Western Region in 1958. We paid two pounds to use Mapo Hall. The NCNC was in control. Adelabu was the chairman of the council and they issued permit to us. But before Awolowo got to the venue after taking an oath of office at the government secretariat, Adelabu had locked the door. When I was forcing the gate open, you were standing by me then (referring to Emmanuel Alayande). So, what is different

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⁶ The electoral value is predicated on the ability of the godfather to deliver electoral victory using his political structure. Thus, in Nigeria, anyone who does not have a political structure spread over the state may require the assistance of those in other zones for assured victory. This is where political patrons come in and become indispensable.

⁷ Identifying with the party controlling the Federal Government. Located at the heart of the city, Oja’ba Mapo Hall is historic, as it served and still serves as the centre for the mobilisation of support for politicians seeking the votes of the electorate. Its location near the market centre provided opportunities to disseminate political information.
from what I did then and now? (Adedibu, IDI)

The above quotation was a retrospective analysis of decades of Adedibu’s use of violence for the ruling class. The above quotation was directed to Emmanuel Alayande who tried to caution against the use of violence in Ibadan. Five decades after, Adedibu ordered his boys (social miscreants) to remove all billboards of the then incumbent Governor Lamidi Adesina for daring to remove the billboard of his godson and gubernatorial aspirant, Rashidi Ladoja. The billboard was erected at government secretariat roundabout. Adedibu’s thugs invaded the state with guns and removed erected billboards, and hijacked government vehicles. The hijacked government vehicles were later taken to Molete. This was few months to the governorship elections. President Olusegun Obasanjo summoned Adedibu to the Ibadan airport with other leaders on use of violence after the incumbent governor had reported him. The President asked what Adedibu’s legacy would be at the age of 76 as he was inflicting violence on the state. To Adedibu, there was no greater legacy than to have dragged the President of Nigeria to Ibadan; and to tell the incumbent that he was no longer wanted on the seat. Adedibu described violence as the trademark of the Ibadan people. He was reliable in fighting for a cause he believed in. He said:

I told President Obasanjo that I am a real Ibadan man and we always cause trouble. That means I am not a bastard. He said at the age of 76? I told him it does not matter. I told him I am even attacking government vehicles. He said why are you doing this? I told him we don’t want Lam Adesina as governor again. It is Ladoja that we want. He asked what my legacy would be. I told him the last time he came to Mapo to campaign, of all the leaders who were there, you repeated it more than three times that ‘Chief Adedibu I leave everything in your care’. That is one legacy. The other legacy is that they told you I am causing trouble and you came down to see me. That is sufficient for me as a legacy. (Adedibu, IDI, 2006)

Destruction of public or private property and arson are criminal offences under the Nigerian law. But rather than getting him arrested, the president chose to visit Adedibu and never apportioned blame to him. Instead, he left, realising the electoral value of the self-styled politician. The 2003 election in Oyo State gave Lamidi Adedibu more relevance as almost all his nominated candidates won the elections. He then nominated political appointees to keep his clientele and patrons’ loyalty. When his hegemonic control of the state politics was threatened by his godson’s refusal to heed his bidding, Adedibu used the federal might, the state house of assembly and the support of wealthy and influential persons within the state to facilitate Ladoja’s impeachment. Ladoja’s impeachment affirmed Adedibu’s relevance as a force to be reckoned with in Oyo State politics. He became the bride to embrace for political ambitions even for those in diaspora interested in home politics. Adedibu described his influence this way:

If you are feeling hungry, you will try to get food. They (aspirants) know it is when they come to me that they can get what they want. They have their own plans before they visit me. Even in London, once people know that I will be around, they will come to lobby me for one position or the other. They want to be governor, honourable member, senator, and so on. (Adedibu, IDI)

With an intimidating charisma, Adedibu installed Alao-Akala, who was Ladoja’s d-eputy, as governor. He strategically imposed his personal assistant, Hazeem Gbolarunmi, as Akala’s deputy to forestall another ‘betrayal’. Although Ladoja regained his seat after 11 months via the Supreme Court judgement, Adedibu’s structure denied Ladoja governorship ticket for a second term. He supported Adebayo Alao-Akala and secured the PDP ticket to contest the elections. He ensured that the campaign office of Akala was in front of his Molete house where he could be monitored.

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9 He was then a member of the NCNC which was in control. He was also the chairman of the council
10 Adesina was the Governor of Oyo State between 1999-2003. He was in the Alliance for Democracy, while Adedibu was in Peopled’s Democratic Party
11 Molete is the area where Adedibu’s residence is located.
12 He was in the same political party with Adedibu

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Lateef Akinsola was the chairman of the National Union of Road Transport Workers NURTW in Oyo State. The transport union was a willing pawn for political intimidation and violence in the state NURTW.
14 Alao-Akala was deputy to Senator Rashidi Ladoja. He became the governor after Ladoja was controversially impeached through the
Adedibu’s style of politics was enticing and tricky. He was in charge of the motor parks (transporters) and, this group, constituted an important political instrument of intimidation and terrorism in the state. Adedibu had his support base in Lateef Akinsola (also known as ’Tokyo’). However, owing to the disagreement between Ladoja and Adedibu, the incumbent (Ladoja) had instituted murder case against Lateef Akinsola (Tokyo) for unleashing mayhem in the state. He was consequently kept behind bars. Akinsola was later released through the influence of Adedibu on Governor Alao-Akala after Senator Ladoja was impeached. Through this ‘assistance’, Akinsola supported all Adedibu’s political steps. In turn, Adedibu assured him of his position as the state chairman of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). It is worthy of note that the transport union played a major role in the impeachment saga of Governor Rashidi Ladoja.

Adedibu’s relevance and influence gave birth to several adjectives, all reflecting that he had the final say in terms of political decisions in the state. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo described him, for example, as the garrison commander and a ‘dry fish’ which is difficult to bend (Daily Trust, 2006). In the literary sense, Adedibu could not be corrected; he was only ‘managed’, with his excesses. Adebibu was condoned by the topmost echelon of the country. Adedibu was called ‘Oracle’, ‘strongman of Ibadan politics’, ‘Alaafin Molete (King of Molete)’, ‘Baba Sope’ (Baba said so). Adedibu was the political oracle with sufficient political wisdom to ensure victory. His word was final. He believed strongly that he had the final say on political issues. He protected his structure by allocating appointive roles and projects necessary to get future supports and votes. Adedibu averred that:

*I continue to thank God for what He has done for me. Some of the persons that have become one thing or the other are grateful. Some are ungrateful but many are grateful. I don’t interfere with how anybody runs his administration. My role is to ensure political success. I know nothing about administration. But I will advise anybody in power that this is politics and the pattern to follow on the promises we made before such a person was elected. People say I am a dictator. I am not a dictator but I can dictate on any political issue because I have the final say on political decisions in Oyo State today. (IDI, Adedibu)*

Further analysis shows that Adedibu’s way of life has been captured in a popular praise chant normally rendered by drummers and his admirers. It depicts him as an unrepentant supporter of a course in which he believes and has committed himself; it equates his greatness to half of Ibadanland embodied in one person; as someone who expects a return from every political favour; and may even claim two-third of a collective deal. The praise chant goes:

*Adedibu Akanji, Abideni. Omo iya olobi l’Oja’ba. Idaaweni ibadan ti won n pe lenikan. O ran’mo nise faya tii. Akanji to re Isale’Jebu to ko adie bo wale, ko jii, ko raa, won o si bun un. Ki lo de, o ludie sagbako ni Omo Aje tii raja tii beere eni. Oni nnkan koo, Adedibu gbaa. Omo Aje boju pon rode rode. Akanji tii gba toro meji ninu kobo kan9 (Adedibu Akanji, Abideni. Son of a kolanut seller at Oja’ba market. The half of Ibadan embodied in one man. He supports whoever he has sworn to back with everything and stays with you in trouble. You are the son of a witch who demands bonus in every deal. Adedibu went to Isale Ijebu and returned with cocks. He did not steal them, yet he did not buy them. When asked how he got the cocks, Adedibu said the cocks were unfortunate/fill-fated. He is the son of a witch who demands bonus from every purchase. He accepts what the owner rejects. His eyes are red. Akanji who takes two-third of every deal.)*

With his vast structure across the state, Adedibu had started preparations ahead of the 2011 elections. His death on June 11, 2008, I argue, has a role in the electoral defeat suffered by the Peoples Democratic Party in 2011.
Although several factors were identified as contributory to the defeat, the relevance of Adedibu in Ibadan politics is irrefutable. Adegbamigbe (2007) asserts that the politics in Oyo State and the performance of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in the state during the general elections of 2003 and 2007 owes to the influence of Chief Lamidi Ariyibi Adedibu. According to him, the victory was largely based on Adedibu’s political style that thrived on patronage and prebendalism. The use of violence as one of his strategies made him similar to someone who is above the law. In the case of late Chief Adedibu, the voters were those who benefited from his peculiar style of benevolence described as “deceptive benevolence” (Ayoade, 2006), popularly known as Amala and Gbegiri politics. This strategy consisted of meeting the subsistence needs of those in the lower strata of the society by feeding them with Amala and Gbegiri, being the staple food in Ibadan and holding court with them (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007). Thus, as part of the grand plan to win the whole of the southwestern part or the Yoruba speaking part of the country, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) appreciated having someone like Adedibu in its fold in order to realise this agenda amongst other strategies (Simbine, 2004).

The Days After June 11, 2008
Adeniran (2008) asserts that there is a problem for the Peoples Democratic Party in the southwest owing to its inability to effectively manage and check recurrent divisions within the party. Perhaps, Adeniran (2008:11) had envisaged the fragmentation of political gladiators in Oyo State when he states that:

...critical observers continue to ask why, in spite of our rich heritage, the abundance of highly experienced men and women, and the galloping material resources in the southwest, we are yet to effectively mediate the centripetal and centrifugal forces renting us apart.

Adeniran’s observation rightly captures the problem which engulfed the PDP in Oyo State in the post-Adedibu era. In the process of reconstructing within the social-political sphere in Ibadan, a pool of centripetal and centrifugal forces emerged under the succession struggle within the PDP. Prior to his death, Adedibu was an authority figure. He mollified all warring parties with political ‘juice’ and silenced norm breakers. His age played a major role in this. The Yoruba scarcely challenge elders. Elders are viewed as repositories of knowledge. Adeboye (2007) argues that age was used in Ibadan as an idiom to naturalise power, which was presented as the prerogative of elders, however they were defined. The important thing is that Ibadan has been structured along the system of seniority at the lineage level. This, then, became the objective reference point in the area of external interrelationships. Apart from this, Adedibu was an Ibadan high chief. The contenders for leadership after Adedibu within the PDP lacked the distinguishing features which were enlisted by the self-styled politician during his political career.

After the death of Adedibu, interests grew and there was an exchange of mutual malice, sarcasm, valour and influence. The politics of Oyo State took a different pattern after June 11, 2008. After the death of Lamidi Adedibu, who symbolised political authority in the party, in particular, and the state, in general, the party faced a leadership lacuna with several politicians claiming to possess the unique authority to become the new leader. A rallying point of politics in the PDP was missing. Adebayo Alao-Akala stepped in as the leader of the party and bankrolled some of the activities of the party. Owing to his style of politics and his spending style, he was described as radically different from Senator Ladoja who was described as miserly. He was called ‘oyato’18. He was extravagant and flamboyant. Analysis revealed that he deployed money to break the ranks of the leaders of the party to garner a support base for his ambition. The importance of money in Nigerian politics has been stressed in previous research. Omobowale and Olutayo (2007) argues that patron-client relationship is sustained through the endowment of material and non-material benefits. The patron is seen as a big man who allows the poor to enjoy out of his wealth (Omobowale, 2008). Akala’s second term ambition was a decision which polarised the party.

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18 Somebody with a difference. He was different in placing and getting followers through spending. Euphemistically, he was called ATM, that is, extravagant.

19 Ibadan does not serve a ruler twice. It is almost becoming a jinx in Oyo State that a ruler will not serve a second term in office but with
Historically, Ibadan has never been ruled twice by a democratically elected governor. This practice goes with the saying ‘Ibadan o ki n singba leemeji’19. Adedibu, during his political war with his estranged godson, Rasidi Ladoja, vowed that he would not rule the state twice as it has never happened in history. This unwritten myth is obscured in historical origin. To him, a term of office was sufficient to allow another person access to the public office. He made allusion to this while opposing the plan by Ladoja to secure a second-term ticket on the platform of the PDP. Instead, Adedibu favoured his new-found godson, Adebayo Alao-Akala. According to Adedibu:

It is impossible for him. He knows that it’s never happened in Oyo State that you will be governor twice. It has never happened. It’s once. Late Bola Ige with his political clout and his association with Baba Awolowo... he could not make it a second term to office. Olunloyo, Kolapo Ishola, and even Lam Adesina...all failed to secure a second term. (Adedibu, IDI, 2006)

Besides the second-term bid, the Ibadan factor in the politics of Oyo State was another problem confronted by the PDP. Before his death, Lamidi Adedibu was an Ibadan high chief. The Olubadan-in-Council was covertly opposed to Adedibu owing to his violence and disruption of peace in the town. In 2007, the Olubadan designate, Oulana Odugade (I) asked all titled chiefs to steer clear of partisan politics. Adedibu was defiant and overtly supported Akala. Adedibu asserted that he remained the political controller of Ibadan politics (Oyedele, 2007). Findings reveal that the Olubadan institution covertly persuaded some interest groups within the state to frustrate the re-election bid of Alao-Akala. A respondent said:

You know that the Olubadan and the governor (Akala) were not in good terms. Olubadan has publicly shown his aversion for the governor. He also asks some prominent Ibadan indigenes to ensure that Akala does not get re-elected. It may be an insult on the Ibadan people. And you know that Akala was also seen as a traitor to Ladoja who is an Ibadan man during the impeachment saga. (Party Chief, IDI, 2011)

The Ibadan elite were opposed to Akala’s second term for retention of history and their aversion to his financial profligacy. It was considered as an affront by the Ibadan people that the governor (Akala) led his supporters to disrupt a book launch for the Olubadan on October 14, 2010. Many prominent Ibadan indigenes including Azeez Arikekola Alao20, Rashidi Ladoja, Teslim Folarin left the Adamasingba sports complex in annoyance (Apanpa, 2010)

Akala was determined to confront the Ibadan people. He coined the name ‘pegunnun’(jinx breaker) to show that it was a historical curse not to have a governor rule twice within the city. He stepped up campaign, despite the fact that there were others interested in the post within the party structure. Owing to obvious opposition and growing apathy for the leadership style of Akala, prominent politicians within the fold of the party broke away to form factions. Formation of factions was influenced by personal, business, and political ambitions. Akala’s centralised political style and administration of the party broke Adedibu’s political dynasty into factions. Party leaders, like former governor Omololu Olunloyo, Dr Dejo Raimi and Chief Richard Akinjide, supported Akala. Obviously, the imperial leadership style of the governor led to disorienting discord which imploded among its members. It was this inability to resolve these tensions which led to inevitable contradictions and tensions within the system (Adeniran, 2008). In the absence of an umpire, political contest in the state became more ferocious. This was akin to the situation after Nigeria’s independence. According to Ayode (2010:20), ‘political contests in the colonial period were moderated by colonial umpires even though they were an interested party. There are no such arbiters after independence when the contests became fiercer. The transition from the struggle for power to the

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19 This politician played a prominent role in harmonising interest groups in Ibadan to present a formidable candidate which ousted Governor Adebayo Alao-Akala, the PDP candidate from office in the April, 2011 gubernatorial elections.
20 It is important to state that before the Ike Nwachukwu committee, the Southwest Zone of PDP had set up the Shuaib Oyedokun Peace
domestication of power is often a rough and uncharted course'.

The Ike Nwachukwu Reconciliation Committee

With many factions in the party, there was the need to close ranks. The party had the Rashidi Ladoja faction (Wolu Solidarity Group), Alao-Akala faction and the Patriotic Elders Forum (PEF) comprising the founding fathers of the party such as Chief Richard Akinjide (SAN), Yekinni Adegojo, Lekan Balogun, Wole Oyelese, Chief Ayantayo Ayandele and Dr Victor Omololu Olunloyo. Later, PEF collapsed and re-aligned forces with Governor Akala. Those who defected were Chief Akinjide, Dr Omololu Olunloyo and Ayandele (This Day, 15 August, 2010). The conflict was how to share the party executive positions among the various interests groups to ensure the party’s victory. On November 5, 2010, the national leadership of the party set up a committee to investigate and recommend the way out of the terrible condition of the party in the state. The panel, which was led by Senator Ike Nwachukwu, recommended the dissolution of the executive of the party in the state to accommodate all existing blocs. It also proposed that the supporters of former Governor Rashidi Ladoja who were de-registered should be given party cards during a re-registration exercise. These were to serve as the first step of reconciliation. These recommendations were never implemented.

The refusal to implement the recommendations of this committee further deepened the crisis. Other factions, other than those in the governor’s bloc, inferred that the incumbent was not ready for genuine reconciliation. The non-implementation of the recommendations was therefore political. The incumbent governor claimed that local elections conducted in the state were won by the party despite the support given by the aggrieved leaders of the party to the opposition. He averred that it was politically illogical for those who worked against the party during the 2007 polls to expect any benefit from the ambition they were hostile to. All these were political calculations to prevent other factions which were now in the opposition to Akala’s ambition to hijack party executive positions which will deny him a second-term ticket. He kept them in suspense while he sought the support of the National Vice Chairman Southwest of the Peoples Democratic Party then, Alhaji Tajudeen Oladipo. The suspense was to jeopardise their ambitions on two fronts: one, they would be unable to get alternative party to contest in the elections; and second, the deadline for the submission of party’s standard bearer would have lapsed. However, all opposition leaders had anticipated the danger inherent in being optimistic that the recommendations would be implemented. They hatched plan ‘B’, involving an underground arrangement with other political parties to hit back at the incumbent.

The opposing factions soon united with a separate secretariat and a steering committee headed by Yunus Akintunde. The group comprised Rashidi Ladoja, Lekan Balogun, Sarafadeen Alli, Yekinni Adegojo, Teslim Folarin, Hazeem Gbolarumun and virtually all Ibadan politicians with associates outside the state. Their move was widely viewed as an Ibadan conspiracy against an Ogbomoso man. Ladoja was not ready to support Akala’s candidacy for a second term owing to the role Akala played in his impeachment of January 12, 2005. He also had the ambition to return to the government house. Others within the group also nursed one ambition or the other. The Abuja political structure favoured Akala’s ambition because of his support for the election of President Goodluck Jonathan and the Obasanjo ‘factor’ as the leader of the party in the Southwest.

In the end, Akala shut the gate against the aggrieved members and, with the backing of Abuja, went ahead to conduct primaries of the party. Other aspirants, including Elder Wole Oyelese, former Deputy Governor Hazeem Gbolarumun and Yekinni Adegojo, boycotted the primaries held at the Obafemi Awolowo Stadium in Ibadan. Other stakeholders of the party, such as the former Senate Leader, Teslim Folarin, Senators Lekan Balogun and Gbenga Babalola, and some other notable PDP leaders in the state did not attend the primaries because of the lack of credibility and transparency which characterised the exercise. This development further aggravated the crisis, as subsequent reactions to it were to cost the party its electoral victory. Although Akala emerged from this
congress as the candidate of the party, as observed by Ayoade (2010: 37), it is safer in Nigeria to offend the state than to offend powerful individuals because, as customary in the country, a crisis is never wasted. It affords ‘an opportunity for re-opening old wounds or inventing usually unrelated issues’. It was obvious that Ladoja nursed old wounds against Alao-Akala’s role in his impeachment and the death of Adedibu afforded him the opportunity to regurgitate the old wounds.

With strong political, economic and social structure, Akala blocked and frustrated the reconciliation moves and return of the leaders opposed to him. As the deadline for submission of names of governorship candidates drew nearer, Ladoja decamped from the PDP and declared his governorship ambition under a ‘virgin’ party, Accord Party (AP). He maintained that ‘people make parties, parties don’t make people’. He used his resources to turn the party into a formidable structure just four months to the general elections. He lost a few of his supporters in the PDP to the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), another popular opposition party in the state. Intra-party divisions are not new to Nigerian politics. Agaraw (2004) and Adejumobi (2007) have claimed that Nigerian political parties were more prone to serious intra-party divisions which may culminate to defection.

Ladoja’s ambition however created problems among the Ibadan elite. He had rejected all entreaties to step down or to support the governorship candidate of the Action Congress of Nigeria, Senator Abiola Ajimobi, who is also from Ibadan. The Accord Party had a strong political base in Ibadan and provided alternative platform for aspirants to contest election and benefit from the ‘political goodwill’ of Ladoja. But while it was obvious that the Ibadan elite wanted Akala out of office, yet Ibadan needed a bloc vote. With Ladoja contesting, they hypothesised he would share the bloc vote from Ibadan while Akala, who had already entered into alliance with the Oke-Ogun people, would enjoy monopoly of votes from that axis. Akala, through his proxies in the party executive, expelled some leaders of the party from PDP. Among those kicked out were Senator Lekan Balogun, Yekini Adeojo, Teslim Folarin, Hazeem Gbolarumun and Senator Gbenga Babalola. They were expelled owing to their rejection of Akala’s ambition and affiliation with the ACN, which had helped brighten Ajimobi’s chances. Octavio (1982) observes that political crises are moral crises. The argument here is that the tussle for affinity with the umbrella party owes to its being the party with an existing structure and a national instinct that the federal might could enhance the candidate’s victory. This notion, according to Ayoade (2010), led party chieftains to boast that PDP will rule for more than six decades. He argues that Nigeria runs ‘partocracy’, because the PDP has become a regime of its own, although not on its own.

Consequences of Unresolved Wrangling

Prior to the senatorial election, the state house of assembly had been polarised. The two camps were those working with aggrieved leaders of the party to frustrate the second-term ambition of Governor Akala and those backing him. The anti-Akala elements in the house planned to hijack the house through impeachment of the speaker, Moruf Atilola. They were unlucky with their plans. (The move was aborted via the intervention of government-sponsored attacks led by the Chairman of the NURTW Lateef Salako and his deputy Mukaila Larnidi, who invaded the House of Assembly. They unleashed violence on the opposition lawmakers while their salaries and entitlements were withheld. This was another action which allowed more enemies regroup against Governor Adebayo Alao-Akala. Although suspended, they vowed to fight the governor. They were willing pawn in the hands of opposition and provided classified information to that effect. One of them said:

Employing arm-twisting tactics of divide and rule as well as intimidation and threat of starvation has silenced some honourable members with whom we started the struggle but the rest of us have remained resolute in our belief that man can only kill the body but no one can silence the idea that is deeply rooted in truth (Anti-Akala Lawmaker, IDI)

On the 9th of April, 2011, senatorial elections were conducted in Oyo State. Against earlier political calculations, the results indicated that the new Action Congress of Nigeria, through several alliances, won the senatorial seats in Oyo South and

Note that only the results of the three main parties in the election were used for this paper. For more on the results see: http://www.incnigeria.org/results/senate

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24 This statement is credited to Former National Chairman of the Party, Vincent Ogbulafor.

25 Lateef Salako, a.k.a “Eleweomo”, emerged as the state chairman of the NURTW after Lateef Akinsola Tokyo ran out of favour with Akala after the death of Lamidi Adedibu. He was believed to have

26 Note that only the results of the three main parties in the election were used for this paper. For more on the results see: http://www.incnigeria.org/results/senate

27 Oyo, Oke-ogun, Ibadan, Ogbomosho and Ibarapa regions.
Oyo Central, while the Peoples Democratic Party won in Oyo North with most votes coming from the Oke-ogun areas. With these results, a new political re-alignment started with some politicians pitching their tent with the ACN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senatorial District</th>
<th>ACN</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>ACCORD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Oyo North</td>
<td>94,896</td>
<td>133,143</td>
<td>27,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Oyo Central</td>
<td>105,175</td>
<td>78,643</td>
<td>92,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Oyo South</td>
<td>127,691</td>
<td>92,359</td>
<td>118,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>327,762</td>
<td>304,145</td>
<td>238,696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INEC

The suspended members of the state house of assembly saw this as an opportunity to remain relevant by entering into working agreement with the ACN. At a press briefing jointly addressed by them, the suspended legislators announced their defection to ACN. They anchored their political decision on realities emerging from the senatorial elections. The ACN had the highest votes cast in the election with an even spread around the state’s five geo-political zones, while the Accord Party, perhaps owing to its newness, was more concentrated within Ibadan region. Unlike the Accord, both the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the ACN enjoyed more geographical spread in the state.

The eight suspended legislators who were PDP members that pulled out of the party were Honourables Kazeem Ayilara, Samuel Ademola Adejumobi, Mohammed Inakoju, Michael Okunlade, Abiola Ayorinde, Tijani Ademola Razak and Kayode Animashaun. In their speech, they averred that:

We have carefully followed the political events in the state since the commencement of electioneering campaigns up to the elections proper and from what we could see, you, the good people of Oyo State have spoken. You have joined your kit and kin in demanding for a change in the way you are being governed, though some political jobbers who featured prominently as commissioners,

special advisers, confidential secretariat between 1999 and 2003 who have now become paid propagandists to this regime...Having therefore consulted widely with family, friends, opinion leaders, students, market women and many other stakeholders, we hereby wish to say it loud and clear that together with our teeming supporters, willingly decide to join hands with the Action Congress of Nigeria to bring back the glory of our dear state.

The results were almost even in the House of Representatives election. The PDP won 5 seats; Accord Party won 4 seats and ACN 4 seats. To my view, the defection of Ayo Adeseun (Akala’s kinsman) into the ACN was PDP’s undoing in the Oyo Central, as the ACN struck an alliance with the Alaafin of Oyo, Lamidi Adeyemi who had been embroiled in crisis with Alao-Akala. The crisis was linked to the fact that Alaafin’s son had been removed from office as the Chairman of Atiba Local Government. Alaafin also claimed that Akala planned to kill him (Vanguard, May 15, 2011). Therefore, the paramount ruler worked against the interest of Akala and campaigned for the ACN on ‘agreed terms’. The vote from Oyo township was strategic, with four local governments (Atiba, Afijio, Oyo East and Oyo-West Local Governments). It was thought that an alliance with Oyo would boost the chances of ACN at the expense of PDP. The choice of Alaafin as a partner was also important to exercise influence on other monarchs in the Oke-ogun zone as the Chairman of the State Council of Obas and Chiefs. The Vanguard of May 15, 2011 quoted Alaafin as admonishing his subjects during the visit of Action Congress of Nigeria campaign train to his palace:

I told you four years ago to vote for the PDP because we thought the party with the national appeal would be the best for our people in terms of the dividends of democracy but what have we got in return? I leave the

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36 Until the period of election, Ayo Adeseun was with the Peoples Democratic Party and Senate chairman on appropriation. He defected to ACN and picked its ticket to return to the Senate.

37 Other sins of Governor Akala to Alaafin included the installation of Chief Ganiyu Ajiboye as Baale of Ago-Oja in Oyo township without the blessing of Alaafin, repeated indirect verbal attack on the institution of Alaafin, dissolution of Atiba Local Government Council headed by Alaafin’s son, Prince Adeyemi and the rotation of the seat of permanent chairman of the State Council of Obas and Chiefs.

SOUllof Ogbomoso)
answers to you all. Show your love to me by voting for the people who have pedigree and are credible to talk to. Show your love to the stool of Alaafin, vote for credible people and, in doing this, don't indulge or engage in violence. Go about lawfully and make sure you protect your votes jealously. The threat that they will attack you and steal your votes is mere empty boasts. There won't be bloodletting in any part of the state. Nobody will be killed here in Oyo. What is in two thousand or five thousand naira they want to give you to buy your voter's cards and ultimately buy your votes to mortgage your future for another four years? I use this occasion to say those of you who had sold their voter's cards to go to them and retrieve them because the unborn generation will not forgive any of you who sold his/her conscience for the mess of porridge. Vote for a political party that harbors no thugs. Vote for a party that does not believe in violence. Vote for a party that will give you dividends of democracy in abundance. Vote for a party that does not use guns and cutlasses. Say no to thuggery, hooliganism and brigandage. Your future is in your hands, vote wisely.

Figure 1 showing the ACN campaign at Alaafin’s Palace

The support of the Ibadan Elders Forum (IEF) also had impact on the outcome of the election. The IEF is an interest group of business men with considerable influence. The IEF believed that successive governments since 1999 have not added significant value to the achievements of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The forum castigated the Akala administration as retrogressing the state and lacking transparency and accountability. Dwindling educational fortunes, decayed infrastructure, sale of government GRA and, more importantly, disrespect for tradition and culture, as exemplified by the conflict between the governor and the Olubadan of Ibadanland, OduLANA Odugade (I); Alaafin of Oyo, Lamidi Olayiwola III; and Soun of Ogbomoso, Oyewunmi Ajagungbade. Akala’s offence to the Olubadan was up-scaling village chiefs to beaded-crown wearing status. This was against the tradition and culture of the Ibadan people.

The IEF maintained that the governor should not be honoured with a second term in office and called on the electorate to vote for the ACN’s Abiola Ajimobi. The forum also opposed Ladoja. They said he had no listening ear with an isolated party which has no national spread and clout. In doing this, they considered the result of the senatorial elections. The chairman of the forum noted that the needed change would be ushered into the state if Ajimobi is voted in. According to him:

The Ibadan Elders Forum has made serious efforts to search for credible and acceptable candidate that will take over the mantle of leadership of Oyo State from 2011. Our criteria of selection are principles of accountability, good governance and rapid development of Oyo State. It includes sound educational background, pedigree, managerial exposure and performance in public office. We believe that Senator Isiaka Abiola Party had 7 members. Not ready to dine with the devil, Ajimobi approached Ladoja for an accord for his party men to work with his party to form the majority. Accord

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33 For more on Gubernatorial election results of 2011 see http://www.inecnigeria.org/results/gubernatorial/ 34 At the end of the polls, no party had the majority in the 32-member State House of Assembly. The ACN had 13, PDP had 12, while Accord
Ajimobi is the best among the candidates paraded by the political parties in Oyo State and Ibadan Elders Forum has no hesitation in endorsing him and presenting him to the generality of people of Oyo state (Ambasador Saanu, 2011:4)

The PDP stakeholders, under the leadership of Richard Akinjide (SAN), however, rose in defence of Akala’s candidacy and dared the Ibadan elders for parochialism and sectionalism. Akala is an Ogbomoso man. The Peoples Democratic Party elders claimed that the antagonism against Akala was based on primordial sentiments. Ibadan is the seat of government and has consistently produced the governor since the return of democratic government. Akinjide avers that:

The truth of the matter is that the hoopla over governor Akala’s performance is born out of the general feeling of Ibadan Elders Forum who have the myopic belief that no one else from any other part of the state other than Ibadan can be the governor. The elders obsession for an Ibadan governor cannot be realised except they decide to come into strategic partnership with other parts of Oyo State. Ibadanland has only 11 local government areas, it therefore cannot meet the constitutional requirement to produce a governor (Akinjide, 2011)

Akinjide argued that previous elections have been dictated with votes from other zones. He was politically optimistic that Alao-Akala, not minding the burgeoning opposition, would still win the polls. He observes that:

When democracy returned to the country in 1999, Alhaji Lam Adesina contested the governorship seat with Alhaji Yekinni Adeojo. Lam emerged victorious with Oke-ogun votes. In 2003, Lam Adesina slugged it out with Rashidi Ladoja. The electoral contest was won by Senator Ladoja with the overwhelming votes from Ogbomoso. Again, in 2007, Adebayo-Alao-Akala defeated Ajimobi with Ogbomoso votes. The Ibadan Elders apparently have chosen to ignore history and it will again deal them a fatal blow in their political misadventure (Akinjide, 2011)

The pro-Akala PDP maintained that the ACN will mortgage the state in the hands of their leader, Bola Tinubu. In the end, however, the polarisation of the party, coupled with other internal and external factors, led to the electoral defeat of the PDP.

As shown in table 2 below, the votes polled by the Accord party (275,773) would have been the gain of PDP if unity had prevailed in the party. Not even the power of incumbency could earn the umbrella party more than 387,132 votes. The ACN worked on the internal wrangling with juicy promises and it gained 420,852 confidence votes of the electorate. Evidently, the impact of the forces within and without the party harmed the victory of the Peoples Democratic Party.

The distribution of the votes shows that Accord polled the majority of her votes in the Ibadan region. The Peoples Democratic Party had geographic distribution but unable to make significant impact within the Ibadan metropolis. The eleven local governments were won by those opposed to the ambition of Alao-Akala. More significant are the votes which came from Oyo township in the Oyo Central Senatorial District. It is significant for this analysis to see the influence of the Alaafin of Oyo’s support for the Action Congress of Nigeria. In the senatorial elections, the Alaafin factor favoured the ACN and her candidate, Ayo Adeoseun, who decamped from the PDP when denied ticket by the Akala political structure.

Table 2: Governorship Elections Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial number</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Vote scored</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ACN</td>
<td>420,852</td>
<td>37.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>387,132</td>
<td>34.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Accord Party</td>
<td>275,773</td>
<td>24.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>15,797</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>5,763</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Party was rewarded with the deputy speakership, 25% of all positions and four caretaker local government chairmen where Accord Party won during the polls (Lagelu, Egbada, Omu-Aura and Ibadan North-East). Not all these have been fulfilled owing to disagreement within the ACN with the arrangement.

He was Akala’s deputy for eleven months after the impeachment of Ladoja. Before then, he was the personal assistant to late Lamidi Adeibulu*
While Alaafin manifestly supported the ACN against PDP, Olubadan and Soun of Ogbomoso surreptitiously perfected their political leanings through their ‘field’ officers. Their stand is understandable. For example, the Olubadan was torn between Ibadan sons contesting the polls. His goal was to ensure that the incumbent (Akala) does not return. Oyewunmi Ajagungbade, on the other hand, is an Ogbomoso king and a contender to the permanent chairmanship tussle, which the Alaafin claims historical hold on. He covertly operated during the polls.

Further analysis shows that Akala delivered his five local governments in Ogbomoso for his party but faltered in Ibadan where Accord and ACN dominated. His conflict with major traditional and political institutions in the state cost him Oyo township, with four local governments, hitherto under the control of the PDP. The loss in the elections was not also unconnected with unresolved conflicts of interest in relation to who rules after the demise of the Oracle of Molete, leading to balkanisation of the Adedibu School of Amala and Gbegiri politics. This finding agrees with Jelin (1993: 25) who asserts that participatory democracy is a conflictive practice related to power, reflecting struggles about ‘who will define common problems and their solutions’.

**Post-election Realities**

The post election realities brought new partnership across political parties. One of this was the working alliance between Governor Abiola Ajimobi and the Leader of Accord Party, Senator Rasidi Ladoja. The agreement was without the consent of the leadership of the ACN. It was to ensure stability in the state house of assembly. Rashidi Ladoja was on a vengeance mission against Alao-Akala for his role in his impeachment on January 12, 2006. But while Adedibu was alive, Ladoja was shut out of the PDP. Adedibu’s machinery denied Ladoja’s followers party registration; hence, they could not make any meaningful political gains after the impeachment. Adedibu’s death was, therefore, a political gain for the Ladoja faction which re-launched into the party as the leadership of the party realised that only a coalition of forces of leaders of the party would assure victory in the face of ACN ‘tsunamic’ take-over of the Southwest. I argue that Ladoja’s role was to prove his political pedigree as having come of age in Oyo politics as a force to be reckoned with. He is likely to remain a force and a rallying point in the politics of Oyo State in the post-Adedibu era.

The unmet needs of political actors led to the emergence of splinter groups. Most of the political

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4 He was Ladoja's Secretary to State Government and later Chief of Staff. He decamped to the Action Congress of Nigeria, with Ayo Adeseun, and some other members of the PDP members of the House of Representatives who were denied ticket by the governor's structure of the party.

5 He is a member of PDP
actors competed for recognition to secure and protect their political and business interests. The tensions are not unrelated with the philosophy of mainstream politics. Many believed that affinity with the centre was necessary for political victory. The internal wrangling which would have been curtailed in the Adedibu era erupted because of the absence of a father figure symbolised in Adedibu. During his time, Adedibu ensured that individuals were placated with juicy appointments both at the state and federal levels; therefore, he maintained his hold on the party as the emperor of politics. His words were not countered, and that was why he was euphemistically called ‘oracle’. Whatever he said was final even when you were not pleased with the decision. This was explored by his supporters to unleash terror on hapless citizens. This led to the use of the phrase ‘Baba sope’ (Adedibu said that...). His name was instrumental for the execution of interests. His demise led to the development of the phrase ‘no more baba sope’ (you can no longer hide under Adedibu). People have to depend on their own structures and the quest for relevance.

Other important forces are Teslim Folarin, Senator Lekan Balogun, Hazeem Gbolarunmi33, Ayo Adeseun, Sarafadeen Alli34, Wole Oyelese, and Yekinni Adejo. Ladoja was not part of this group, as his ambition made him pull out of the earlier coalition. These forces worked on Adedibu’s clientelist structure with juicy promises under a new regime. This redefinition of alliances affected the 2011 elections results. The NURTW also factionalised along Lateef Akinsola ‘Tokyo’, supporting the move to oust Akala, while Lateef Salako ‘Eleweomo’ supported Akala. ‘Eleweomo’s death, however, dealt a big blow to Akala’s camp.

In conclusion, the Peoples Democratic Party has no doubt, missed the coordinating ability and political dexterity of Adedibu in grass-roots mobilisation. The centrifugal forces which ousted Akala were part of Adedibu’s clientelist structure. Adedibu would have played a major stabilising role if he was alive. Adedibu would have pacified warring parties to ensure that he maintained his hegemonic control on the party. According to a former chairman of a local government under Alao-Akala, the PDP mourn the loss ofAdedibu and are still searching for the rallying point. He said:

We are missing Baba so much. Baba is the greatest internal democrat that I have ever seen. But we envisaged what is happening now. After his death, a consortium of leaders emerged over the party. Baba would have pacified whoever is aggrieved and we would not be where we are today. I believe that we must begin to talk and
harmonise, close ranks. We must strategise ahead of future elections. We are missing Baba so much. (PDP chieftain, Akinjide faction)

The interplay of dexterity spurred by raw daring strength (most times with violence), closeness to the grass-roots and an unrivalled ability to strategise within the political sphere made Adedibu the destination of choice for politicians who wanted elective or appointive offices by all means. It is obvious that things have fallen apart and the centre seems far from holding. The PDP needs to re-invent a new leadership figure that will be acceptable to the people through the entrenchment of effective internal democracy.

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